THE MUNICIPALITY OF PARIS CONFRONTS THE PLAGUE OF 1668
In the 1660s the bubonic plague, quiescent for a decade, once more returned in force to western Europe. Along with the great epidemic of 1665 in London, there was pestilence in the United Provinces and in Normandy and Picardy. In 1668 Paris heard reports ofplague at Soissons and Amiens; by July the port of Rouen, downstream from the capital along the Seine, was stricken. As the epidemic threatened commercial routes to Paris, the authorities there put into motion traditional measures designed to restrict communication with afflicted communities. The safety of Paris-a capital numbering nearly one-half million and potentially a point of convergence for persons or merchandise carrying plague-was at stake."
A variety of officials enforced regulations against pestilence, among them the minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the Parlement of Paris, and the municipality. The outbreak of an epidemic in the spring of 1668 prompted the Parlement (fundamentally a high court of law that occasionally legislated) to restrict commerce entering or leaving Soissons and Amiens. Guided by Colbert and the Six Merchant Guilds2 of Paris, the Parlement agreed to restrict trade between Paris and Rouen, too. Its decree of 27 August forbade transport of goods by land between the two cities. As for river traffic, all boats were to sail upstream to Mantes to be unloaded so that goods 'susceptible to bad air' be ventilated and remain in quarantine at least forty days.3 Merchandise considered safe was to proceed, apparently with less delay, to Paris in other boats manned by persons other than those that had set out from Rouen. Soon the Parlement defined relatively harmless products to include cattle, tin, lead, and cheese. 4 The 27 August decree forbade passengers en route to Paris to proceed to the city till after quarantine in places chosen by conseils de sante, health councils, along the Rouen-Paris route. To supervise enforcement of its order and choose a spot for airing merchandise bound for Paris, the Parlement relied on the municipality of Paris. The court sent as its delegate to Mantes, roughly fifty miles downstream, the Parisian echevin Jacques Belin and entrusted to the magistrate substantial powers.
The municipality-lodged at the Hotel de Ville and led by aprJvot of merchants and four echevins, or aldermen-did not lack qualifications for this mission. It was familiar with sanitary conditions within the city and knew the river system leading to Paris. In fact, the municipality exercised authority over navigation on the Seine and several tributaries, as well as jurisdiction over river commerce bound for Paris.
In the meantime, the municipality had already become deeply concerned with what seemed to be a local crisis. A visitor from Amiens, a stricken town, had become fatally ill in Paris. Fearing an outbreak of plague, the pr6vot of merchants located a residence 418
News, Notes and Queries in the Faubourg Saint-Germain suitable to quarantine persons who had visited the deceased. The municipality also directed quartiniers, subalterns assigned to the several quartiers of Paris, to find out where guests of inns had come from; owners were to house no one from Amiens or any other afflicted area.
Fortunately no pestilence appeared during the quarantine period. But the municipality's action did prompt another in a series of traditional quarrels between the H8tel de Ville and the Chatelet, the royal magistracy in the capital headed by Nicolas de La Reynie, lieutenant of police. On the day that confined persons were scheduled to be released, an Jchevin arrived at the quarantine residence for that purpose, only to find that La Reynie had effected the release five hours earlier. The municipal registers did not fail to note that the Chatelet's action was base ingratitude: the magistrates who had contributed their time and 'the goods and revenues of the city' to combat pestilence had been humiliated by a rival." A preoccupation with preserving or augmenting one's jurisdiction, rather than fundamental differences of policy, is the more likely explanation for such quarrels. As events will show, only a few months later the prvo6t of merchants outflanked the Chatelet in an almost equally petty dispute taken on appeal to the Parlement.
Once News, Notes and Queries Belin's report shows that the authorities were much preoccupied with forbidding indiscriminate traffic and requiring travellers to enter towns only by main roads. To this effect they devised roadblock systems. At Poissy it was necessary to close all gates but two and repair the town walls. The courier from Rouen to Paris was entering Magny, where he left mail for another courier to dispatch to the capital. Belin forbade that, ordering the first courier to avoid Magny, drop the packets elsewhere and pass them through fire before the Paris-bound messenger intercepted them. And on a return trip to Poissy the echevin, discovering that a baker had refused to remove hogs from his house, fined the miscreant ten livres. 8 The jurisdiction of the municipality over plague prevention was hardly exclusive. guilds were 'compelled to obey us', the city magistrates said.12 They pointed out that in 1567, for example, the king had ordered the magistrates to assemble one of the Six Guilds to seek its advice on a certain tax. After compiling a historical essay on the guilds' duties, the city ordered them to appear the following Friday.
The Six Merchant Guilds appealed their case to the Parlement, which decided it with unwonted speed. The merchants recalled that once the Hotel de Ville had ordered their appearance, their 'naturaljudge', the Chatelet, had summoned them before its tribunal. To the guilds this was a matter ofpolice genJrale subject to the Chatelet's authority; the municipality's action was simply encroachment. When Claude Le Pelletier, prvo't of merchants, replied, the municipality's interests were 'never sustained with more vigour and eloquence', the registers say.'3 After hearing all parties, the Parlement upheld the Hotel de Ville and ordered the guilds to send representatives to testify.
At last, on 10 January, the guildsmen came to the H6tel de Ville and advised prohibition of the fair on the ground that the major portion of goods was bound to come from afflicted areas. In his turn the prevot of merchants advised the Parlement to permit the Saint-Germain fair!14
During the first week of the fair, the municipality admitted, merchants sold textiles (a source of contagion); but the rest of their sales consisted of merchandise from Parisian shops or safe goods from outside of Paris. The Hotel de Ville said it opposed reducing to dire necessity artisans who manufactured woollens by forbidding the sale of their products. Better than trying to stamp out illegal commerce, which they expected in any case, the city magistrates much preferred a legal trade subject to precautions against contagion.
In the light of the seriousness of the plague, the quarrel over the guilds' appearance at the Hotel de Ville had little substance beyond the need to express self-esteem. But when the guilds finally spoke, they stood on the side of caution. while the city magistrates reflected the discontent of tradesmen stemming from plague restrictions. Even the highly influential Colbert was hesitant to impose an embargo for fear of its impact on commerce and the expected hostility of the artisans. But since there was a certain consensus on means of confining pestilence, confirmed by time-honoured regulations, the rivalries among the Parisian authorities apparently did not paralyse official action.
In fact, the Parlement and the HOtel de Ville co-operated-even if the monarchy;preferred to rely on the more powerful and increasingly prestigious royal magistracy, the Chatelet. Equally important, the central authorities, particularly Colbert and the Parlement, enforced regulations more effectively than could a multitude of local officials in earlier centuries.15 As for Belin, he was part of a Parisian magistracy partially responsible for dealing with sanitation and air and water pollution, and at the same time the Parlement's instrument in enforcing blockades and quarantines in communities close to Paris; his particular task was to isolate Paris from the deadly epidemic at Rouen and elsewhere. It is reasonable to suppose that the efforts (however 421
News, Notes and Queries medically uninformed) of the municipality, the Chatelet, and the central authorities contributed to the end result. Paris was safe from plague. The Society for the Social History of Medicine set themselves an ambitious task in fostering a new field of study, the scope and purposes of which are difficult to define. In his Inaugural Lecture to the Society, Professor Thomas McKeown presented a personal definition of this field and gave some examples of subjects that could profitably be studied by attempting to write 'medical history with the public interest put in'.I This definition and its implications raise matters ofgreat concern to the social historian. The purpose of this essay is to elaborate these concerns in the hope of stimulating further discussion ofthe problems involved.
According to Professor McKeown; the social history of medicine is much more than a blend of social history and medical history, more than medical developments seen in the context of the period; it is essentially an operational approach which takes its terms ofreferencefrom difficulties confronting medicine in thepresent day.
It is the lack of such insight, derived from contemporary experience, which makes a good deal of medical history so sterile for the uninitiated.'
It is regrettably true that until recently, much medical history was indeed sterile. To a historian, most of it was mere antiquarianism, relieved by hagiographies of outstanding physicians. Happily, this situation has changed considerably in recent years, and there are now several works which can profitably be used by the social historian who wishes to investigate the place of medicine in a given society. Surely the chief task of social historians of medicine is to provide more of the broad interpretive studies presently lacking.
Professor McKeown proposes a strikingly different task. According to him, the only social history worth pursuing-which will be neither sterile nor esoteric-is one which '. . . takes its terms of reference from difficulties confronting medicine in the present day'." Clearly his basic purpose is not to understand the past, but to provide necessary information for reforming present evils. This purpose is unhistorical. It has little to do with the study of history as understood by historians, whether they be interested primarily in diplomatic, constitutional, economic or social history. Most historians would admit to being some combination of artist, chronicler, detective and assessor: none should call himself a social planner. 423
